In this work, we present an information propagation game on a network where the information is originated from a sponsor and the sponsor is willing to pay a fixed total budget to the nodes who propagate the information. The goal is to design a mechanism to share the budget such that all nodes are incentivized to propagate the information to all their neighbours. We propose a family of mechanisms to achieve the goal. The mechanisms incentivize all nodes to propagate the information to their neighbours even though the total reward shared among them is fixed. We also consider the cases whether the budget has to be completely shared. Our solution can be applied for advertising via social networks with limited budgets.
Introduction
Recent years, with the help of the Internet, people start to take advantage of social media to propagate information to their friends [4, 2] . For instance, if an online retailer wants to advertise her products but she cannot afford a high advertising fee on ad platforms, one alternative is to incentivize her friends or customers to propagate the information on social networks. If a survey team want more people to fill their questionnaires, they may try to incentivize people to spread the survey out to their friends or neighbours. The key idea of above instances like viral marketing or questionnaire survey is propagating information via social networks [12] .
There exists a rich literature that brought the idea of social network to classical marketing or mechanism design problems. For example, Brill et al. [3] proposed a false-name-proof information collection algorithm for recommendation decision in social networks, in which they introduced the concept of weight on each node in the social network. Shen et al. [15] proposed multi-winner contests (MWC) mechanism for strategic diffusion on social networks which satisfied several desirable properties including false-name-proof, individual rationality, budget constraint, monotonicity and subgraph constraint. In the marketing problem, Emek et al. [7] presented a theoretical framework for reward mechanisms in multi-level marketing within social networks and established a full characterization of the geometric mechanism family. Later Drucker and Fleischer [6] proposed a family of mechanisms to prevent Sybil attacks by profit maximizers while preserving its original properties in the multi-level marketing. Moreover, Li et al. [11] proposed an auction mechanism in a singleitem auction setting to incentivize buyers to truthfully report the valuations to the seller as well as propagate the auction information to all their neighbors through a social network and Zhao et al. [17] further generalized it to the setting of multiple items. For the cooperative games, Douceur and Moscibroda [5] proposed a lottery tree that motivate people to join or contribute to a networked system that does not offer them inherent participation benefit, but probabilistically rewards each participant in a manner dependant on its contribution as well as on the contributions of others whose participation was led by them. Furthermore, Abbassi and Misra [1] proposed multi-level revenue sharing for referral-based and viral marketing over online social networks to achieve computability, individual rationality and potential reach. They designed the graph-based model in which they showed that computing Shapley value is #P-hard, and the tree-based model where computing Shapley value is in polynomial time.
There has been some previous work on finding and propagating influential nodes in a social network in order to trigger a cascade of further participation. Wang et al. [16] proposed a price-performanceratio inspired heuristic scheme to economically select seeds within a given budget and meanwhile try to maximize the diffusion process. David et al. [10] provided provable approximation guarantees for efficient algorithms of selecting the most influential nodes. Galeotti and Goyal [8] investigated how firms (and governments) can harness the power of social networks to promote their goals.
There are also some work on incentive referring and participation. Naroditskiy et al. [13] conducted a field experiment that compared several mechanisms for incentivizing propagation via social media in support of a charitable cause. Gao et al. [9] surveyed the literature of theoretical frameworks and experimental studies of the incentive strategies used in participatory sensing.
All the work above share the same motivation of information propagation via social networks. In this paper, we focus on how to incentivize people to propagate information for a sponsor, which is a more high-level problem of the above settings. In our setting, the sponsor has a fixed budget to reward those who propagate information for her. The goal is to incentivize people to propagate information to all their neighbours or friends. Note that this is not achievable if we simply use fixed reward for each invitation as the sponsor will certainly pay more than the budget in this case.
In our setting, the most challenging problem is that the reward distributed to all agents is bounded in advance. Hence, inviting more people means there are more people to share the limited reward. The well-known winning solution from the 2009 DARPA red balloon challenge is a successful attempt [14] but it only works in a tree model when there is an actual task to do. It also cannot fully use the budget in our setting. To combat these problems, we propose a novel reward sharing scheme that incentives people to propagate the information to all their neighbours even though the reward shared among them is fixed. Our scheme gives people strong incentives to propagate information and can completely uses the whole budget.
Specifically speaking, our contributions advance the state of the art as follows:
• We define the model of information propagation game on a graph and define the concept of propagation incentive compatible to guarantee the information will be fully propagated on the graph.
• We propose a novel budget distribution scheme that can satisfy the new concept to achieve maximal information propagation. Moreover, it uses all the budget, i.e, it is budget balanced. • Some practical issues have also been discussed to show that our proposed mechanisms are applicable.
The remainder of the paper is presented as follows. Section 2 introduces our model and sets the preliminaries. We begin with a simple starter mechanism in Section 3. Then, in Section 4 we propose our novel budget distribution scheme that guarantees the maximal information propagation. Finally, we discuss some special issues in Section 5, and conclude in Section 6.
The Model
We focus on an information propagation game where a sponsor wants to propagate a piece of information to as many agents as possible via agents' social connections. In the real-world applications, the connections between agents can represent friendship or neighborhood and the sponsor may want to propagate an advertisement or any other information that she wants more agents to be informed. We investigate a reward mechanism for the sponsor with a fixed budget to incentivize agents to propagate the information to all their neighbours. This is not achievable if we simply give each agent a fixed reward for propagation or proportionally divide the budget among all agents who propagated. The former cannot be budget-balanced and the later cannot incentivize agents to propagate.
Formally, let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of all agents in the network and a special agent S ∈ N , which is called sponsor, wants to propagate a piece of information to the others. We model the network as an unweighted directed acyclic graph (DAG) G = (N, E) rooted at S. Each edge (i, j) ∈ E indicates that agent i propagates the information to agent j via the edge. All the rewards given by the sponsor S to other agents come from a fixed budget B. Let G be the space of all networks satisfying our setting. We define the reward mechanism as follows.
Definition 1.
A reward mechanism is defined by M : G × R+ → R |N | . Given graph G = (N, E) ∈ G and a budget B ∈ R+, the output of the mechanism is M (G, B) = r = (r1, r2, . . . , r |N | ), where ri is the reward assigned to agent i. Note that in the definition of the reward mechanism, rS can be viewed as the budget left after the reward distribution to all other agents. Then it is reasonable to regard feasibility as the minimum requirement of the reward mechanism, where the sum of reward ri is the budget B.
Except feasibility, the sponsor may not want to overspend. We require the reward assigned by the mechanism is bounded by the budget, otherwise the sponsor will have a deficit. This property is called weakly budget balanced. Moreover, if we want a mechanism being applicable to incentivize propagation, agents should not suffer loss from participation, in other words, we need to guarantee individual rationality. Finally, the most important property we investigate in this paper is how to incentivize information propagation in the network. We define this property as propagation incentive compatible.
where G e is the graph deduced from G without the edge set e.
Such a mechanism is called strongly propagation incentive compatible (SPIC) if the strict inequality holds.
The property of propagation incentive compatible means that each agent does not suffer loss from the information propagation. If a mechanism is strongly propagation incentive compatible, propagating information to all her neighbours is an agent's unique dominant strategy.
In the rest of the paper, we design mechanism satisfying all the above properties.
A Simple Starter Mechanism
Firstly, we propose a simple reward mechanism which is weakly budget balanced and propagation incentive compatible. The mechanism, which is inspired by the solution of the winning team in 2009 DARPA red balloon challenge [14] , gives a comprehensible starter for our proposed scheme in the following sections.
In the solution of the winning team in 2009 DARPA red balloon challenge, they promised a half of the reward to the person who found the red balloon, then a half of the remaining reward to the person who invited the founder and so on. We have the similar intuition in or starter mechanism where the reward is discounted by a constant ratio for each layer. More specifically, denote the shortest distance of an agent i to the sponsor S by di, and the set of agents with depth l by L l = {i|di = l}, which is also called layer. Our simple mechanism will first distribute the reward to different layers. For each layer L l , the reward B l of L l , which is distributed to all agents from L l , is defined as
where β is the discount factor and B is the total budget that satisfies 0 < β < 1 and B > 0. Intuitively, the total reward to each layer is fixed so that inviting more agents will not hurt the inviter's reward since the invitees are in the next layer. Therefore, in each layer L l , we can simply divide the budget B l proportional to the number of agents invited by each agent. More specifically, let ni be the number of agents that agent i propagated the information to and f : R → R be a positive and monotone increasing function. Then the reward distributed to an agent i ∈ L l is defined as
The full description of this simple mechanism is illustrated in Mechanism 1.
Mechanism 1 A simple starter mechanism INPUT: the graph G and the budget B
Using breadth first search to compute the layers L1, L2, . . . , L lmax for l = 1 : lmax do
OUTPUT: the reward vector r
We illustrate how Mechanism 1 works in the following example.
Example 1. Consider the following information propagation network illustrated in Figure 1 . The sponsor S firstly propagates the information to A and B. Then A and B further propagate the information to their friends C, D and F , and so on. Suppose the total budget S has is B = 10, we apply Mechanism 1 and let β = 1 2 and f (n) = n. Taking the first two layers as example to compute the rewards. For L1, the reward A and B get are
For L2, only agent C propagates information to others. Hence, agent C will take all the reward distributed to L2, i.e.,
and rD = rF = 0, because nD = nF = 0.
Proposition 1 shows that this simple mechanism has some nice properties.
Proposition 1. The Mechanism 1 is weakly budget balanced, individual rational and propagation incentive compatible.
Proof. For weakly budget balanced, we can check the total reward distributed to every agents other than the sponsor:
for propagation incentive compatibility, since f is monotone increasing, then for every agent i ∈ L l , if she does not propagate information to all her neighbours, n i < ni, we have
where r i is the reward if i only propagates information to n i neighbours 2 . Therefore the mechanism is weakly budget balanced, individual rational and propagation incentive compatible.
A General Scheme
Although the simple starter mechanism described in Section 3 has satisfied the properties of WBB, IR and PIC, there are still some concerns. The first concern is that we cannot fully use the budget in this simple mechanism since the graph is limited. The other concern is about "fairness": once the discount factor β is fixed, the reward allocated to each layer is fixed, no matter how many agents they have propagated the information to. For example, considering the two networks shown in Figure 2 , each of the two agents of L1 in the Network 1 propagates the information to two other agents, while Network 2 they propagate the information to four other agents. However, according to the Mechanism 1, the two agents of L1 share the same reward (equals to (1 − β)B/2 if the total budget is B) in both networks. Hence, Mechanism 1 cannot tell the difference between those two cases, and it does not give agents strong incentives to invite more. To tackle the problems of Mechanism 1, we futher characterize the mechanism from a new perspective. Consider the step where we allocate the reward between the two adjacent layers, L l and L l+1 . Suppose the remaining budget for them is B l , we define the reward distributed to agents in L l as
Without knowing the successive layers after L l+1 , we can "virtually" distribute the remaining budget β B l to agents in L l+1 uniformly. For each agent j in L l+1 , her virtual reward is B j . Then we can rewrite the above equation of total reward given to the layer L l as
where B i is the agent i's virtual reward in the last distribution between L l−1 and L l . At last we distribute the reward B l to agents in each layer L l . Using this definition, the simple starter mechanism described in Section 3 can be redefined as following.
Mechanism 2 An alternative version of Mechanism 1 INPUT: the graph G and the budget B
Using breadth first search to compute layers L1, L2, . . . , L lmax .
Budget Distribution Scheme
Note that the problem of "fairness" still occurs in Mechanism 2 since in each iteration, the proportion of the budget distributed to the agents in L l is fixed. To tackle this problem, we introduce a new term when we consider the reward distribution between layers L l and L l+1 as
where β is the discount factor and Ai is the bonus factor such that 0 < β < 1 and 0 ≤ Ai < 1.
The bonus factor here is to give extra reward for the propagation effect of the agents in the layer. Now we give our generalized budget distribution scheme as Mechanism 3.
Mechanism 3 Budget distribution scheme INPUT: the graph G and the budget B
Using breadth first search to compute layers L1, L2, . . . , L lmax and L l max+1 as virtual layer. For each i ∈ L1, set B i = B/|L1| for l = 1 : lmax do for each i ∈ L l compute Ai according to its propagation
OUTPUT: the reward vector r Note that the simple starter mechanism is the special case of the budget distribution scheme when the bonus factor Ai is always 0. We can easily show that this generalization is IR and WBB.
Theorem 1. The budget distribution scheme (Mechanism 3) is IR and WBB.
Proof. Note that 0 < β < 1 and 0 ≤ Ai < 1. Then for any layer L l , we have
Hence, the properties of IR and WBB holds.
Intuitively, to distinguish the differences of the networks in Figure 2 , we give extra bonus for their propagation. The bonus is additional to the proportion in the starter mechanism because it is the key to maintain the property of PIC, i.e, the fixed proportion guarantees that new comers will not decrease their inviters' reward. Now we consider how to choose the proper bonus factor Ai. To incentivize propagation, Ai should be some function depending on the number of agents been propagated. Consider an agent i ∈ L l , let ni be the number of agents i directly propagates to and n−i be the number of agents others in L l propagates to, i.e., n−i = j∈L l j =i nj. Then intuitively, Ai should increase when ni increases since we want to give agents in L l more rewards if they propagate the information to more neighbours. On the other hand, Ai should decrease when n−i increases since we want to bound the bonus given to agents in L l (to avoid the budget left to the next layer being too less) and creates competition among agents in layer L l (the difference between agents' propagation also matters). Therefore, we introduce a reasonable design of Ai as:
where 0 < α < 1 is the division factor. Note that under this definition, Ai is decreasing when n−i increases and 0 < Ai < 1. Then the total reward distributed to agents in layer L l in the budget distribution scheme is
After deciding the discount factor Ai, we need the mechanism which distributes B l to agents in L l and B l+1 to L l+1 in the scheme. We propose one solution in Mechanism 4, which performs quite well as we will show in the following sections. 
for all i that propagates information to j do
OUTPUT: ri for each agent i ∈ L l and B j for each agent j ∈ L l+1
In Mechanism 4, for each node i ∈ L l , her reward is divided into 2 parts, the V h part and V b part. Intuitively, here V b serves as the basic participation reward and V h serves as extra reward for the propagation. If i propagates information to an agent, each other agent j ∈ L l in the same layer should provide a reward of α · j.V b to i and the new coming agent, where 0 < α < 1 and β is the proportion of reward distribution between i and her child agent. Thus, the new child agent in the next layer will get α · (1 − β) · j∈L l ,j =i j.V b and the agent i will get α · β · j∈L l ,j =i j.V b . Note that the final reward distribution is related to the order of agent in L l+1 being selected in outer loop. Here we just randomly choose an order. In practise, we can achieve more properties if the order is well-treated, which will be shown in Section 5.2. An example is illustrated below. Figure 3 and the budget is B = 30. In the mechanism, we set α = β = 0.2. Now we show the process of reward distribution.
and for all agents their V h are set to 0 at the beginning.
• When A propagates to D, A and D will be rewarded, while B and C will be taken a proportion of reward. From the mechanism, we know that the proportion is α = 0.2. Therefore:
And the reward taken from B and C will be distributed between A and D by a proportion of β, therefore:
• The procedure is similar when B propagated to E. However, we should notice that here C.V b has been updated, so we should use the new value in computation:
Now we show that the Mechanism 4 satisfies the scheme described in Equation 1. For each agent i layer L l , the part V b of the final reward distributed to her is (1 − α) n −i · B i . On the other hand, the total propagation reward to all agents in L l is
Therefore, the total final reward distributed to layer L l is: 
Properties of the Budget Distribution Scheme
Now we show that this mechanism holds all the properties we need.
Theorem 2. The budget distribution scheme that uses Mechanism 4 is individually rational, budget balanced and strongly propagation incentive compatible,.
Proof. For IR and WBB, the proof is completed in Theorem 1.
For budget balanced, note that when we come to the last layer L lmax , for all agent i ∈ L lmax , ni = 0. Therefore, B lmax = B lmax since Ai = 1. Hence, the mechanism is budget balanced.
For strong PIC, each node can control all of its descendants by choosing to propagate or not to propagate. To prove a mechanism holds the property of PIC, the descendants action should by no means reduce the ancestor nodes' reward. Therefore the following 2 requirements should be met:
1. The single propagation action will not reduce the parent node's reward.
The propagation of the descendants should not undermine the an-
cestor node's reward.
We first consider condition 1. For a node i, when it propagates to a new node, it gains reward from other nodes. Assume that the original reward owned by this node is ri, after one propagation, its reward becomes
where j represents the node that whose part of reward has been taken due to i's propagation. β, α, Rj are always positive. Therefore the second term should always be positive. Therefore r i > ri, and the first requirement is fulfilled. For the second requirement, we need to focus on the propagation of a node's descendant. In the algorithm, when one of the descendant propagates, it will only take reward from the nodes on other branches. Therefore this action dose not affect the reward of all the propagation node's ancestors. With the proof of the first requirement, the mechanism is strong propagation IC.
Note that Theorem 2 guaranteed not only the property of PIC, but also strong PIC. This makes propagating to all their neighbours a unique dominant strategy for each agent. Therefore, in practice, the mechanism can achieve the maximal information propagation if there's no limit on time for propagation.
Other Issues

Special Cases of the Scheme
Now we consider some special cases of our proposed scheme. The two special cases are listed below:
1. If the participation of a child node involves all of the upper layer nodes, there will be no nodes to take from the upper layer. If there are more than 1 nodes on the upper layer, our solution is to take reward from all the parent nodes. 2. If there is only one parent node on the upper layer, our solution is to recur upward to find a structure similar to that mentioned in 1, and take propagation reward from the parent nodes as in 1.
To handle these special cases, we can simply modify the Mechanism 4 as shown in Mechanism 5.
Here we give an example on the special cases for better understanding. In figure 4 , assume that S owns a budget B = 30 and α = 1 3 , β = 1 5 . In the same initialization as we did in tree based mechanism, S first gives out all the reward to A and B. So we have
Then all 3 nodes of the first layer propagates to C, which is the case where the child node has no other branch to take reward from. According to our mechanism, C will take α of each parent node's current reward away. Therefore
. When C further propagates to node E and F , there is only one parent propagating and the parent node C has got no siblings. Therefore this is the second special case where we need to recur back to find a ancestor node which owns two or more parents, which is C. C has got 3 parents and consequently E and F will take reward from C's parents. Finally, 
x := P; while x.parents.size = 1 do j += 1;
x := x.parents; end for y in x.parents do N := x.parents.size;
OUTPUT: ri for each agent i ∈ L l and B j for each agent j ∈ L l+1 Theorem 3. The budget distribution scheme that uses Mechanism 5 is propagation incentive compatible, individual rationality and budget balanced.
Proof. Propagation IC: There are two cases for proving Propagation IC. First, all graphs where it is necessary to apply the above additional graph mechanism must satisfy: 1. All nodes in the previous layer all serves as the node's parents. Or there will definitely be other branches to take money from and can thus apply tree mechanism. 2. If we need to apply the tracing back step, the node in the ending circumstance must satisfy condition 1. Otherwise from the beginning of the algorithm, there will be other branches of nodes and thus we can apply tree based mechanism. With the graph mechanism, we must guarantee that the money taken from the parent nodes should be less than the money taken if they choose not to propagate.
• case1: In the first special case mentioned above, by performing the mechanism, we can see that in one such propagation:
Ni is the number of parents owned by the child node, which should be bigger than 1 because the child node has more than one parent. Thus
From (1) and (2), we can prove that the reward taken from parent node is less than the reward taken if they do not choose to propagate in the first special condition. • case2: In the second special case, we face a situation where there are even no parents to get reward from. Take Figure: 4 as an example. The latter node may seek back to upward layers for reward. Thus we need to consider if the propagation of the upper layer node who offers reward is truthful or not, in this case is the propagation from node A, B or D to C. Because each node in a segment of single chain may take reward from the upper layer node, we derive the following proof:
N again is the number of nodes who is the original ancestor of the single chain. In Figure: 4 the original ancestors of single chain C-E are A, B and D, so N = 3 in this case. In all circumstances N should always be bigger than 1 because the termination condition in the mechanism is to find an ancestor node with more than 2 parents, and the ancestor node's parent number is N so we have:
(Reward taken without propagation) ≥ α · bx ≥ 2α · bx N Which indicates that propagation will help the node to lose less reward. Then we can prove that it is Propagation IC in both special cases. The core idea is to use a prisoners' dilemma as shown in Table 1 , where > 1 and r > 0. Along with the property of Propagation IC in tree based mechanism, we can prove that the graph based mechanism is Propagation IC. 
Time efficiency
At last, we consider the case what will happen in practice where we introduce a new concept of the time vector t here. We discuss a new property called time efficiency. Participants should be willing to propagate as soon as possible in the mechanism, otherwise there may exist a deadlock in propagation. For example, if the mechanism is designed to make every node willing to propagate after a first propagation led by another node, none of the nodes will be willing to propagate first. This may be disastrous to our mechanisms. Thus we define time efficiency to be: Proof. Consider the reward of node i, which has two parts V b and V h , thus ri = i.V b + i.V h . Let the reward of propagation obtained by node i to be ri. If i propagates at time t, i.V h = α · β j∈J j.V (t) b , where J represents all the nodes that will be taken reward from because of i's propagation. Now assume that i choose to propagate later at t , if there are another gj ≥ 0 propagation during the time interval [t, t ] that will take reward from node j, j.V b will be j.V
. So for all j, we have j.V
, and we have:
jb is decreasing in terms of t. Therefore spreading immediately is the dominant strategy.
Conclusions
In this paper, we formalized an information propagation game on a network where a sponsor is willing to pay a fixed reward to incentivize agents to propagate information for her. The model has many promising applications where social networks are well engaged such as viral marketing and questionnaire survey. We proposed a novel scheme of the reward sharing mechanism which is propagation incentive compatible and budget balanced. We also offered an instance of our scheme where strongly PIC, BB and time efficiency are achieved.
There are also several aspects that worth further investigation. For example, Sybil attack is a common issue in real-world applications based on social networks. It seems very challenging to achieve both PIC and Sybil proof in our settings. Another example is to extend our solutions to the settings of resource or task allocation, where we have the dimension of competition for the resource or task.
